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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
RODNEY C. ROSE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
12974 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant appeals his conviction of Sale of a Stimu-
lant Drug on the ground that the information charging 
him with the crime specified "methamphetamine" rather 
than "amphetamine". 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The complaint that charged appellant was amended 
to read "amphetamine" rather than "methamphetamine". 
Appellant's main defense was to establish an alibi, ques-
tionable identification procedures and possible mistakes 
in preserving and handling the drugs in question. The 
court sitting without a jury found appellant guilty. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent prays that the decision of the low er mur 
be affirmed. · 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 7, 1971, a complaint was issued againsta 
pellant which charged that on April 19, 1971, he "did: 
lawfully sell a stimulant drug, to wit: Methamphe~ 
mine" (Tr. 1). At the preliminary hearing on Ocm~· 
8, 1971, the State moved the court to amend the com 
plaint to read "amphetamine" in lieu of "methampheta. 
mine". Defendant's objection to this motion was ove1 
ruled and the complaint was amended (Tr. 11-12). TIE 
complaint was amended by · manually crossing off th, 
first four letters of the word "methamphetamine" (T1. 
1) . \Vhen the information was prepared, for some reason 
it did not reflect the amendment authorized at the pri· 
liminary hearing. Thus, appellant was arraigned on !ht 
charge of "Sale of a Stimulant Drug committed as follow~. 
to wit: That said defendant did unlawfully sell a stimu· 
lant drug, to wit: Methamphetamine" (Tr. 14). Appel· 
lant waived his right to a jury trial (Tr. 89). 
During trial, the information was read and no objec· 
tions were made by either side (Tr. 90). 'The State t.oxol· 
ogist testified that the pills in question were amphe!A· 
mine tablets. Upon cross examination, counsel for appel· 
lant never asked the State toxologist about methamphe!A· 
mine drugs but only questioned him concerning amphem 
. ti ~ mine drugs even though the State toxologISt men on 
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that his tests could distinguish methamphetamine from 
amphetamine (Tr. 136). Counsel for appellant attempt.eel 
to establish that ( 1) the appellant was not accurately 
identified, (2) there were possible mistakes in preserving 
and handling the drugs, and (3) the appellant had an 
alibi (Tr. 180-182). No attempt was made by appellant 
to question the type of drug involved or to argue that it 
didn't meet the crime as charged. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE APPELLANT WAS PROPERLY 
CHARGED AND CONVICTED OF SALE OF 
A STIMULANT DRUG. 
A valid and sufficient information may charge a de-
fendant either by stating the name of an offense or by 
stating enough of the definition of the offense as is suffi-
cient to give the defendant and the court notice of the 
offense intended to be charged. Utah Code Ann. 
~ 77-21-8 (1953). The information that charged appellant 
both named the offense and stat.eel a definition of the 
offense. The name and definition of the offense are 
found in Utah Code Ann. § 58-33-6 ( 1) ( 1971 Supp.), 
which states, "It shall be unlawful for any person to ... 
sell . . . any depressant, stimulant, or hallucinogenic, or 
other drug ... " The term "depressant, stimulant, or 
hallucinogenic drug," among other definitions means: 
"Any drug which contains any quantity of 
(A) amphetamine: dl-methamphetamine; or any 
4 
of_ th~ir optical isomers; ~B) any salt of am h 
mme. dl-methamphetamme· or any salt f P em 
t . al . f ' 0 an O[ I~ isomer o amphetamine: dl-metham h · 
r:ime; or (C) any substance designated by!~ 
tions promulgated under the federal act as hab 
forming because of its stimulant affect [effect! 11 
the central nervous system." Utah Code~ 
§ 58-33-1 ( 1971 Supp.) . 
The information which charged appellant states th, 
name of the offense as the Sale of a Stimulant Drug ail 
defines the offense by stating that "said defendant iliu 
unlawfully sell a stimulant drug to wit: Methamphefu. 
mine" (Tr. 14). Clearly there is enough information \ii 
give the court and appellant notice of the offense charged 
i.e., sale of a stimulant drug. 
The basis of the error claimed by appellant is tbai 
the information contained the word "methamphetarnine 
instead of "amphetamine". There are four reasons wh1 
this alleged error did not in any manner prejudice appel· 
lant's trial. First, the naming of a particular drug is sur· 
plusage. In the case of People v. Gelardi, 175 P. 2d ~i 
(Cal. App. 1946), the defendant was convicted undern 
information charging him with selling "a narcotic, 1:-0 wit: 
Opiates," rather than selling a n2.rcotic, to wit, morphine. 
The court held that the specification of opiates add~ 
nothing whatever to the information, and that it may~ 
treated as mere surplusage. The court continued: "How· 
ever, without any specification of either opiates or mor· 
phine, the accusation is sufficient, for it follows the Ian· 
guage of the statute ... " Id. at 857. In the present~. 
the information charging appellant follows the language 
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of the statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-33-6(1) (1971 
Supp.) supra. Since the language of the statute is fol-
lowed by charging appellant with the sale of a stimulant 
drug, the naming of a drug is surplusage and not required 
to be included in an information. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 'i'i-21-42 (1953). 
In the similar case of State v. Madsen, 28 Utah 2d 
108, 498 P. 2d 670 (1972), this Court found no error in 
the fact that the drug identified at trial was different 
than the drug named in the charge since the sale of the 
drug idrntified at trial was a prohibited act. In the pres-
ent case, it is unquestionable that the sale of ampheta-
mine is a prohibited act and that the drug identified at 
trial was amphetamine. 
Second, the appellant could have found out any in-
formation about his charge if he were actually in need 
of additional information by demanding a bill of particu-
lars. Utah Code Ann. § 77-21-9 (1953). 
Third, appellant cannot wait until he is convicted to 
challenge the sufficiency of the information. In the case 
of State v. Courtney, 10 Utah 2d 200, 350 P. 2d 619 
(1960), the defendant made no attempt prior to his con-
viction to challenge the information and then alleged that 
it did not meet the statutory requirements. This court 
held that the information did comply with the Constitu-
tion and statutes of the State because the charge used 
the name given the offense by statute. In continuing, 
this court said: 
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."Furthermore, his failure to demand a bill 
1 
particula:s, precludes ~he defendant on this a 01 
to q~est10n, .for the frrst time the sufficien~~ 
the mformat1on." Id. at 621. l '· 
. In t~e present case, appellant neither challenged \ht 
information nor demanded a bill of particulars 80 ht 
should be precluded from challenging the infonnation on 
appeal. 
Finally, the use of "methamphetamine" was m°'t 
likely a clerical mistake which was not caught by either 
party. During the preliminary hearing, it was recognizro 
that the drug in question was amphetamine. The com. 
plaint was allowed to be changed by crossing off the fust 
four letters of "methamphetamine" with a pen (Tr. 1, 
11-12) . The hand correction is ambiguous and could ~ 
the reason for the correction not appearing on the infor. 
mation. Utah law provides that no information that con· 
forms with § 22-21-8 shall be invalid because of any "mis· 
writing". Further, no appeal based on any such imper 
fection shall be sustained unless it is affirmatively shown 
that the defendant was prejudiced in his defense. Uhl 
Code Ann.§ 77-21-43 (1953). 
Certainly, there was no prejudice to appellant's de· 
fense when ( 1) no objection was made concerning the 
information as read, (2) counsel for appellant used the 
word "amphetamine" when cross examining the Stati 
toxologist, and (3) no attempt was made by appellantro 
question the type of drug involved or to argue that the 
drug in question did not meet the crime as charged. An 
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appellant cannot expect a new trial when he has been 
charged with stealing a cake, to wit: chocolate; and his 
only claim on appeal is that the cake was angel food. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant's trial can best be characterized as a situa-
tion wherein both sides were talking about amphetamines, 
where appellant was convicted of selling an amphetamine 
but that due to a mistake, the information said "meth-
amphetamine" which resulted in no prejudice to appel-
lant. The conviction of the lower court must be upheld 
because appellant was properly charged and convicted of 
the crirne of selling a stimulant drug. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
DAVID S. YOUNG 
Chief Assistant Atoorney General 
WILLIAM T. EVANS 
Assistant Atoorney General 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
